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Abstract   
Assuming that partisan fairness and responsiveness are important aspects of redistricting, it is 
important to measure them. Many measures of partisan bias are satisfactory for states that are 
balanced with roughly equal proportions of voters for the two major parties. It has been less clear 
which metrics measure fairness robustly when the proportion of the vote is unbalanced by as 
little as 60/40.  We have addressed this by analyzing 2004-2012 election results compiled by 
Stephen Wolf for four states with Democratic preferences (CA, IL, MA, and MD), three states 
with Republican preferences (SC, TN, and TX) and comparing those to results for four nearly 
balanced states (CO, NC, OH, and PA). We used many statewide elections in each state to build 
statistically precise seats-votes and rank-votes graphs to which many measures of partisan bias 
were applied.  In addition to providing values of responsiveness, we find that five of the 
measures of bias provide mutually consistent values in all states, thereby providing a core of 
usable measures for unbalanced states.  These include two relatively new measures, declination 
and global symmetry, a brand-new counterfactual-free seats measure, as well the older measures 
of deviation of seat fraction from 50% when the vote is shifted to 50% and deviation of the vote 
fraction from 50% required to obtain 50% of the seats. Although all five measures focus on 
different aspects of partisan bias, normalization of the values across the eleven states provides a 
suitable way to compare them, and we propose that their average provides a superior measure 
which we call composite bias. Regarding other measures, we find that the most seemingly 
plausible symmetry measure fails for unbalanced states.  We also consider deviations from the 
proportionality ideal, but using it is difficult because a state’s political geography can entangle 
responsiveness with total partisan bias. We do not attempt to separate intentional partisan bias 
from the implicit bias that results from the interaction of a state’s map-drawing rules and its 
political geography, on the grounds that redistricting should attempt to minimize total partisan 
bias whatever its provenance. 
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1. Introduction   
It is well recognized, not only by political scientists and politicians, that redistricting 
Congress and state legislatures is important. Indeed, ordinary citizens have engaged in drawing 
maps using free public software.1 Not surprisingly, there are many criteria that can be considered 
in judging maps and different people place different weights on the different criteria.  This paper 
focuses on two of those criteria that we think are especially important, namely, fairness and 
responsiveness.2        
Our measures of bias are for total partisan bias, of which overtly intended gerrymandering is 
just one part.  There is also underlying bias due to political geography which is called 
unintentional gerrymandering (Chen and Rodden 2013). That bias is being quantified using 
ensembles of maps drawn by computers that use the criteria that a state prescribes in its rules.3  
That provides a benchmark that is then subtracted from the bias of the adopted plan to estimate 
intended gerrymandering bias.  While this is what is traditionally required for court cases 
(Grofman 2019, McDonald, et al. 2018), we emphasize that unintentional bias is no longer 
unintentional if it can be reliably demonstrated that it occurs when following the state’s rules or 
other informal criteria (Nagle 2019).  This bias then becomes systemic bias due to the state’s 
map drawing criteria interacting with its political geography.  If there is such systemic bias, there 
may still be plans that are outliers in the ensemble that are nonetheless fair, and we believe a 
redistricting commission should adopt such a plan rather than an average plan.  However, if no 
relatively fair plan is possible within the state’s rules, then we believe the state should change its 
election law to make fair plans possible. Even if a state’s rules cannot be changed in time, a 
redistricting commission and concerned map-drawing citizens could still try to minimize total 
                                                     
1 Some examples are ‘Dave’s Redistricting App’ (Bradlee 2020), ‘districtr’ 
(MetricGeometryandGerrymanderingGroup 2018) and ‘JudgeIt’ (Gelman, et al. 2012).  In 
Pennsylvania, the Committee of 70 has provided Draw the Lines software (Thornburgh 2018) for 
people to draw maps to compete for substantial prizes; it unfortunately only uses registration at the 
overly coarse census tract level instead of election results at the precinct level. 
2 Responsiveness is often called competitiveness, but we prefer responsiveness to voters over 
competitiveness for parties (Nagle 2019). 
3 Of course, implementation of the rules in the computer code necessarily involves subjective weighting 
of the different criteria, population equality, compactness, splitting political subunits, communities of 
interest and minority protection. Remarks made by Katz, et al. 2020, 176 and McGann, et al. 2016, 110 
regarding the use of computer drawn map ensembles to evaluate bias are especially pertinent. 
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bias and achieve responsiveness.4 As has been reviewed by Stephanopoulos 2013, numerous 
states have had language promoting fairness and responsiveness, but these efforts have been 
hampered by uncertainties in defining and measuring these concepts, and that is what this paper 
is about.  
This poses the question: Is it possible to test whether a proposed redistricting plan for 2021 
will be fair and responsive to the voters?  Our approach to this question is to analyze the enacted 
redistricting plans for 2011 using many statewide election results applied to those maps.5  This 
paper presents evidence that the use of past election results can indeed produce quite precise 
information that can be used for evaluating a plan before it is implemented.6  We suggest that 
this exercise can be relevant for the next round of redistricting after the 2020 census, at least in 
those states that have redistricting commissions not intent on political advantage.   
Even in states controlled by one party, the findings in this paper may help challenge unfair 
and unresponsive plans in court. However, we again emphasize that our work is not focused on 
challenging plans in courts that, in lieu of precise laws regarding fairness and responsiveness, 
typically require evidence of partisan intent to overturn a map.7  Political geography, such as 
high density of Democrats in cities, can also create unfair and unresponsive maps (Rodden 
2019), especially when conventional redistricting criteria such as compactness and not splitting 
political subdivisions are adhered to (Nagle 2019).  Our goal in this paper is to elucidate 
measures of total bias and unresponsiveness, whatever their provenance.8  Map drawers can then 
choose how to balance these metrics with other criteria9 and a state legislature can be better 
informed about whether its state election law should be modified. 
                                                     
4 This echoes the discussion of McGann, et al. 2016, 222 that “Electoral fairness is not something that 
occurs ‘naturally’; it has to be actively pursued” and Altman and McDonald 2018,108 that a solution 
may be to explicitly incorporate political goals into the redistricting criteria. 
5 Statewide elections are the same for all precincts whereas results for Congress or state legislatures are 
subject to incumbency differences as well as uncontested elections. 
6 Although this conclusion will not come as a surprise to many political scientists, e.g. (McGann, et al. 
2016, McDonald, et al. 2018,  Gelman, et al. 2012, Grofman and King 2007, Stephanopoulos and 
McGhee 2018, Wang, et al. 2018), the methods and evidence presented here may still be of interest, 
especially for the express focus on unbalanced states. 
7 See Best, et al. 2020 for insightful concerns regarding reliance on a partisan intent standard.  
8 Following the authors in the previous footnote 6. In particular, “the absence of intentional unfairness is 
not the same as fairness” Katz, et al. 2020,170. 
9 Critieria balancing has recently been discussed by Altman and McDonald 2018 . 
4 
 
For states that are evenly balanced between two dominant parties, a fair plan is clearly one 
that is likely to result in half the seats for half the votes.10  It has been rather more challenging to 
decide what a fair plan is for a state in which one party routinely obtains considerably more than 
half the votes (McGhee 2014, Wang 2016, Nagle 2017).  It has appeared reasonable to assert that 
symmetry is required in the sense that if party A wins fraction SA of the seats with fraction V of 
the vote, then party B should win the same fraction SB = SA of the seats if it received the same 
vote fraction (e.g., McGann, et al. 2016, 56).  A difference in seats ∆S = SA - SB between these 
two seat fractions would then appear to be a reasonable measure of bias, with ∆S = 0 being no 
bias.  This has been recently named the β measure of bias (Katz, et al. 2020, 166).  It obtains the 
value ∆S(<V>), where the <V> means that we calculate ∆S from the most likely statewide vote 
<V> determined by the average over many statewide contests and from its counterfactual 
counterpart when the vote fraction is reversed to 1 - <V>.  
In order to calculate ∆S(<V>), one must obtain a seats-votes curve S(V) which estimates the 
fraction of seats S for any statewide vote fraction V (Katz, et al. 2020, 165).  We have calculated 
S(V) curves for the Congressional plans of 11 states.  By using many past election results, our 
S(V) curves have quite small estimated uncertainties. Details of our methodology are presented 
in Appendix A.   
The seats-votes curves are quite interesting, and they are appropriate for evaluating the 
responsiveness of a plan.  However, Section 3.2 of this paper shows that the β measure of bias is 
highly misleading for states with a dominant party.  This came as a shock to us, as symmetry and 
this way of evaluating it would appear to be so fundamental to what should be considered fair.  
We will show how and why the β measure fails by examining the vote shares vj for 
congressional districts j in the form of a different kind of graph that we call rank-vote r(v) 
                                                     
10 Technically, we estimate the voter preferences of the districts in a plan. These should be balanced such 
that half the seats would be won if equally attractive candidates are nominated by the parties when the 
overall statewide vote is split evenly.  Of course, these conditions are unlikely to be met in any real 
district which is why actual elections are important, so our methods are therefore not designed to 
predict outcomes for individual districts.  Nevertheless, for states with many districts, such influences 
tend to average out, so it becomes possible to predict overall outcomes more reliably.  Even so, that is 
not the goal. Rather, as mentioned by Cervas and Grofman 2020,7, it is to test the fairness and 
responsiveness of a plan ab initio, before specific candidates are chosen and before people and parties 
decide how to allocate resources to the various contests.  It is also certainly not the goal to predict the 
vote fraction in a future election, only to estimate what the overall preference would be given the 
overall vote fraction V.  
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graphs.  The r(v) graphs are also quite precise because we again use many election results. They 
are presented in Sections 2-4. 
The r(v) graphs together with the S(V) graphs enable us better to portray and understand bias.  
Nevertheless, as has been well known for a long time, there is still ambiguity in the single 
member district system as to what is fair in states that have a dominant political party. In such 
unbalanced states, bias and responsiveness become intertwined (McGann, et al. 2016,67).  For 
example, if the two-party political balance in a state is 60/40, then a plan that has each district 
with a 60/40 preference would likely elect all its representatives from the same party.  That 
would be fair under the aforementioned β symmetry principle.11 It may also be the only 
possibility if the political geography of the state is completely homogeneous.12 However, if the 
state’s political geography were completely heterogeneous, one could draw a map that 
guarantees a 60/40 split in the seats,13 but one could also combine the precincts to give all seats 
to the dominant party or to any split between these extremes.   
Whatever one deems fair in the preceding examples, they illustrate that the political 
geography of a state could clearly be important for assessing bias and responsiveness in 
unbalanced states (Rodden 2019).  We examine this further in Appendix C where we recall the 
ideal of proportionality in Section C.1.  This leads us in Section C.2 to a method to measure bias 
in unbalanced states that takes political geography into account, and a qualitative analysis of 
states is given in Section C.3. However, that approach is difficult to apply to any single plan, so 
the main line of analysis in this paper proceeds differently in Section 5.  Symmetry is defined in 
subsection 5.1 in more nuanced ways than the β measure, continuing with subsection 5.2 that 
defines a completely new measure (γ) of bias, followed by subsections elaborating on the 
declination (δ) measure (Warrington 2017) and the lopsided outcomes (LO) measure (Wang 
2016,1263) and concluding in Section 5.5 by considering maximal responsiveness as the primary 
goal,   Comparisons of these and more standard measures of bias are given in Section 6 which 
crucially demonstrates that a core subset consisting of five of these measures of bias is 
substantially consistent across the 11 states, including unbalanced states, and we propose that 
                                                     
11 One would have 40/60 preferences in each district if 1/3 of the dominant party’s voters switch and then 
the other party would win all the seats and therefore β = 0.  
12 If every precinct has the same 60/40 balance, all districts must have the same 60/40 balance. 
13 This is most easily seen by defining complete heterogeneity as 60% of the precincts having only 
dominant party voters and creating districts only from like-minded precincts.  
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suitably averaging their values into what we call composite bias Ω provides a superior estimate 
of bias. Subsection 6.3 also tests measures of bias for durability as the statewide vote share 
changes. 
A general discussion ensues in Section 7. Our main result that several measures of bias agree 
for unbalanced states as well as for balanced states leads us to conclude that total bias can be 
reliably measured in all states even though the political geography varies by state.   
2.  Analysis of four politically balanced states  
This section also describes some of our terminology. 
2.1 Example of Colorado  
We begin with the state of Colorado (CO).  The average statewide vote <V> for 12 elections 
in the time period 2004-2012 was 50.6% Democratic, making this a politically balanced state in 
that time frame. Figure 1 shows the average two-party Republican vote fraction vj for each 
congressional district (CDj, j=1-7) along with the standard error of the mean over 12 elections.14  
The districts are rank ordered according to their placement j in a list that is ordered by the vote.  
We call this kind of graph the rank r(v) graph because it plots the district rank versus the votes vj 
in the districts.15  According to the r(v) graph in Fig. 1, CD1 and CD2 were strongly Democratic 
and CD4 and CD5 were strongly Republican in the 2011 CO map, whereas CD3, CD6, and CD7 
were more competitive.16  
                                                     
14 Following McDonald, et al. 2018, we used data from Wolf 2014.  Lists of the chosen elections for all 
states are given in Appendix A, along with a brief description of Wolf’s data.  Along with others 
(Backstrom, et al. 1990, Gronke and Wilson 1999, McDonald 2014, Cervas and Grofman 2020, Powell, 
et al. 2020, Abramowitz, et al. 2006) for the purpose of determining political preference, we prefer 
statewide elections data over actual congressional elections which do not uniformly evaluate precincts 
in different congressional districts, partly because of incumbency and uncontested elections.  Also, 
there are more statewide races for more precise statistics. 
15 It is convenient to express the rank axis r as (j - ½) divided by the number of districts in the state, where 
j is the rank in the ordered list, so the rank axis uniformly spans the range 0 to 1 for all states. 
16 Indeed, districts 1, 2, 4, and 5 remain with the same party when any of the statewide elections are 
applied to them, whereas districts 3, 6, and 7 switched parties for different elections.  Note that the 
uncertainty bars on the r(v) data in Fig. 1 are standard errors of the mean which indicate the precision of 
the partisan preferences of the districts.  The standard deviations are the square root of 12 (number of 
elections) greater; while the standard deviation would better show the switching of parties in CD3 and 
CD7 from different statewide elections, the standard error of the mean better indicates the precision of 
the district preferences.   
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An r(v) graph displays the partisan preferences of each district in a state.  It is also often used 
to count the partisan number of seats in the following too simple way.  In Fig. 1, one might say 
that preferences17 in CO are for three Democratic seats, in districts 1, 2 and 7, and four 
Republican seats, in districts 3-6.  However, that ‘first-past-the-post’ assignment doesn’t take 
into account uncertainties in competitive districts like CD6, so instead we assign probabilities to 
districts thereby obtaining fractional seats.18 Furthermore, Fig. 1 is for only one overall statewide 
vote share <VR> = 49.4% Republican, the complement of the Democratic two-party vote share.  
What is also needed is a different kind of figure, namely, the seats-votes S(V) graph, which 
estimates the fraction of seats S for any two-party statewide vote fraction V.  We use the 
proportional shift method to adjust each district vote vi as the statewide vote shifts.19  Our S(V) 
graph for CO is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Colorado r(v) graph for 
the 2011 plan shows Republican 
district rank vs. Republican 
district vote. The slope of the 
linear fitted line to the districts is 
ρ = 2.9.  The horizontal 
uncertainty bars are standard 
errors of the mean. The 
declination is the difference in 
the angles of the two solid lines 
(vide infra). 
 
 
                                                     
17 Notice that we do not write that CO would be expected to elect three Democrats.  By using statewide 
election results, we deliberately do not take incumbency in a district into account because the goal is to 
evaluate the partisan preferences of the 2011 map independently of political contingencies.  
18 For example, a district that has a 50/50 partisan preference should count as half a seat for both parties. 
Details for fractional seat assignment (Nagle 2019) and other technical aspects in this paragraph are 
given in Appendix A.  Fractional seats have been employed in various ways by Gelman and King 
1994,532 and Cottrell 2019, and the concept is nicely explained by McGann, et al. 2016, 58-60 where 
the 5% variation that is employed in our study was suggested.    
19 Although a proportional shift (Nagle 2015, 2019) is conceptually superior to the commonly used 
uniform shift, the difference between the two is not consequential for the results in this paper as is 
shown in Appendix B.   
8 
 
Fig. 2.  S(V) graph showing Democratic 
seat fraction vs. Democratic votes 
fraction curve for the Colorado 2011 
enacted plan as a continuous solid 
curve.  Each election ε generated an 
Sε(V) curve (not shown) using 
proportional shift and fractional seats, 
and the shown solid S(V) line is the 
average with standard error of the mean 
uncertainties as solid vertical bars.  The 
solid circles are the results of each 
statewide election applied to the plan.  
The star shows the estimated seat 
fraction for the average statewide vote 
<V> for all elections.  The diamonds 
show the fraction of seats won in the 
actual congressional contests carried 
out under the 2011 map. 
An important result from S(V) curves is the responsiveness of a map.  How many seats are 
expected to change as the statewide vote V changes around V is just the slope dS/dV of the S(V) 
curve at V.  Of course, the slope varies with V if the curve is not linear and then the most 
relevant measure of responsiveness is ρ = dS/dV at V = <V>.  Because the S(V) curve for CO is 
quite linear, however, its responsiveness is nearly the same for all V.  An important finding for 
the CO 2011 plan is that its responsiveness is quite high, namely ρ = 3.3.20  This is far higher 
than the responsiveness ρ = 1 idealized by proportionality and even for the efficiency gap (EG) 
(McGhee 2014, Stephanopoulos and McGhee 2018) which idealizes responsiveness of ρ = 2.  It 
is closer to the classical cube “law” (Kendall and Stuart 1950) that has ρ = 3 at V=0.5.  
Each solid circle in Fig. 2 shows an unshifted result from one election.  Already, those points 
could be simply fit to provide a reasonable S(V) curve.  Our method is more precise, as is 
indicated by the standard errors of the mean shown as vertical bars on the S(V) curve.21  The 
diamonds in Fig. 2 show actual congressional seats for the 2012-2018 district elections.  These 
                                                     
20 This value of ρ means that a swing of 5% in the statewide vote V would change the estimated seat 
fraction by 16.5%.  For CO with 7 districts, that is a net swing of a bit more than one congressional 
seat. 
21 Also, our method does not require choosing a fitting function, such as a bilogit King and Browning 
1987.  Although a linear fit to the circles in Fig. 2 would work well enough for CO, other states are 
considerably nonlinear. 
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agree with the S(V) curve as well as could be expected, given that they must be integers in first-
past-the-post elections, and that they are affected by contingencies such as incumbency.  
2.2.  North Carolina  
We turn next to North Carolina (NC), another nearly balanced state with Democratic average 
vote <V> = 51.5% in the statewide elections in our data set.  Fig. 3 shows its r(v) graph.  It is 
very far from linear as shown by the dash-dot line, which is the best linear fit, so the 
corresponding slope of 1.85 is meaningless as a measure of responsiveness. Fig. 3 emphasizes 
the well-known fact that the 2011 map for NC has three heavily packed Democratic districts and 
ten safe Republican districts that are not packed.   
An interesting measure of bias is the declination δ, which Warrington (2017) has defined as 
the difference in the angles of the two straight lines joining the open circles in Figs. 1 and 3.22  
Packing Democrats into a few districts moves the middle open circle in Fig. 3 to smaller ranking 
of the districts won by Democrats which increases the differences in the angles of the lines 
connecting to the average party votes, so a positive value of δ correlates with an advantage for 
Republicans.  This measure gives a large positive δ for NC, in contrast to a much smaller value 
for CO. 
Fig. 3.  Republican district rank 
vs. Republican district vote 
r(v) graph for North Carolina 
2011 plan.  The difference in 
the angles of the two solid 
lines is the declination δ 
which equals 57.3o using 
first-past-the-post seats and 
votes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
22 Each outer circle locates the average vote for each party’s seats. The middle open circle in Figs 1 and 3 
locates the fraction of Democratic seats.    More details regarding this measure are provided in section 
5.3.  
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Fig. 4 shows the S(V) curve for NC.23  As it is derived from the data in Fig. 3, it too is highly 
non-linear.  Again, the individual statewide election results shown by solid circles agree well 
with the S(V) curve.  So do the actual congressional election results for 2012-2018, but these 
also show that NC voters tended to vote more conservatively for congress than for the statewide 
elections; the latter average <V> is shown by the star whereas the range of the actual 
congressional statewide vote average is centered near 0.48.  This is important for evaluating 
responsiveness.  The slope of the curve at <V> is quite high, shown as ρ = 4.0 in Fig. 4.  
However, the slope is close to zero near V = 0.45 which is the low end of the actual range of 
congressional elections, thereby indicating an unresponsive map favoring Republican 
incumbents in ten districts.  
Fig. 4.  Seats-Votes S(V) graph 
for the North Carolina 2011 
enacted plan.  The solid S(V) 
curve was obtained using 
proportional shift and 
fractional seats.  Each contest 
is the result of each statewide 
election applied to the map.  
The star shows the average 
statewide vote for all elections.  
Diamonds show actual 
outcomes. The arrows indicate 
measures defined in the text.  
 
 
We will use Fig. 4 to illustrate our definitions of several other quantities of interest.  One 
such is the slope R of the arrow pointing from the center of the graph to the star on the curve.24   
A negative value of R = -10 signifies an anti-majoritarian result, fewer than half the seats for 
                                                     
23 The reader may wonder why we have chosen to use Republican rank and votes axes in our r(v) graphs 
and Democratic seats and votes in our S(V) graphs.  The reason is that doing so makes the r(v) and 
S(V) curves look more alike. For example, the median district with rank 0.5 has R vote greater than 0.5 
in Fig. 3 and the Democratic vote V to obtain half the seats is greater than 0.5 by very nearly the same 
amount.  Indeed, using first-past-the-post and uniform shift, the r(v) curve with R axes becomes an 
S(V) curve with D axes.   
24 R = (S(<V>) – ½)/(<V> – ½).   It is quite different from responsiveness ρ which is the tangent to the 
S(V) curve given by the derivative dS/dV at <V>. 
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more than half the vote.25 For unbalanced states R is positive and can be thought of as a winner’s 
bonus.  For want of a better name, it may be thought of as an overall responsiveness. 
An important seats-based measure, much employed in the literature, is the seats bias defined 
as the difference in the fraction of seats from 0.5 when V = 0.5.  In this paper we will designate 
this measure by αS.  Its magnitude is the length of the vertical arrow in Fig. 4, favoring 
Republicans by 20%. An important votes-based measure will be designated αV; it focuses on the 
estimated fraction of the vote for 50% of the seats.  In Fig. 4, 54.3% of the vote would have to be 
won by the Democrats in NC to win half the seats. We designate the αV value to be this vote at S 
= ½ minus 0.5; it is the length (in %) of the horizontal arrow in Fig. 4. 
2.3. Other balanced states 
The results in the previous section clearly identify the 2011 NC map as unfair to Democrats 
and unresponsive to voters.  We have also drawn r(v) and S(V) graphs for the 2011 maps of two 
additional fairly evenly balanced states, Pennsylvania and Ohio.26  The αS, αV, δ and R values 
for PA and OH are rather similar to NC in being unfair and anti-majoritarian, and quite unlike 
the results for CO which appear to be both fair and responsive.  
Table 1 collects numbers for the quantities of interest mentioned in this section for balanced 
states.  This table also shows values of quantities that will be defined in subsequent sections.   It 
further exhibits results for several unbalanced states to which we turn in the next two sections. 
Uncertainties in many of the quantities can be discerned by the reader from the error bars in the 
S(V) graphs.  For example, typical uncertainties in αS are less than 1%.   Uncertainties have not 
been estimated for δ; the values in Table 1 were calculated using fractional district seats and 
votes which differ from the values in the legends of our r(v) graphs which used the original first-
past-the-post definition of Warrington, 2017. 
 
 
 
                                                     
25 The 2018 actual congressional election also was anti-majoritarian as shown by one of the diamonds in 
Fig. 4.   
26 These and graphs for other states will be available in SM. 
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Table 1.  A list of the states and many of the quantities of interest obtained in this paper.  
Values are expressed as percentages except for the responsiveness measures R, ρ, ζ and the δ 
angle.  Positive values for measures of bias favor Republicans. 
• <V> is the average statewide two-party vote for Democrats. 
• S(<V>) is fractional Democratic seats at <V>. 
• R is an overall measure of responsiveness or winner’s bonus defined in Fig. 4. 
• ρ is the slope of the S(V) curve at <V>. 
• ζ is a measure of responsiveness defined in section 5.5. 
• α1 = αS is half the difference in party seats at V=0.5. 
• α2 = αV is the excess vote required for half the seats. 
• δ is the value of the declination angle calculated using fractional seats and votes. 
• GS is a global symmetry measure described in section 5.1. 
• γ  is the fair difference in party seats at <V> using ρ 
• Ω is the average of the five previous measures, each normalized to the αV scale. 
• β gives the counterfactual symmetry difference in seats. 
• LO shows values for the lopsided outcomes measure described in section 5.4. 
• PR is the deviation from proportionality S(<V>) - <V>. 
• EG is the efficiency gap 
• mM (not shown in table) is the median minus mean.  
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3.  Republican majority states   
This section examines several unbalanced states with a substantial Republican majority.   
3.1  Tennessee and the ‘Wall’ 
Tennessee (TN) has an average D vote <V> = 0.416.  Its r(v) graph in Fig. 5 shows a highly 
Democratically packed CD9, while CD5 leans Democratic and there are 7 safe Republican 
districts that figuratively form a ‘wall’.  The graph is quite non-linear and this and the wall are 
reflected in the large positive value of the declination angle δ  .  The corresponding S(V) curve in 
Fig. 6 agrees well with the statewide races (solid circles) and it agrees as well as can be expected 
with the actual congressional results given that those are constrained to be integers and that the 
incumbency effect may have helped retain the second Democratic seat.  The values of the seats-
based measure αS and the votes-based measure αV given in Table 1 are similar to those of the 
balanced states NC, OH, and PA.  This comparison suggests that TN is also biased against 
Democrats.  Unlike those states, R is positive, and there were no anti-majoritarian results (solid 
circles in Fig. 6) where more than half the votes yielded less than half the seats. The large value 
R = 3.6 gives a substantial winner’s bonus of 2 seats compared to R = 1 proportionality. The 
much smaller value of the responsiveness ρ compared to all the other states in Table 1 is 
consistent with the drawing of mostly safe seats for both parties as would be done in a bipartisan 
gerrymander.  
                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Rank-vote graph for Tennessee.                        Fig. 6.  Seats-votes graph for Tennessee. 
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Figure 6 introduces a new measure of bias which we will abbreviate as γ. It uses the 
responsiveness ρ evaluated at <V> to calculate a seat fraction Sρ.  In Fig. 6, an arrow emanates 
from the fair point at S=0.5 for V=0.5 with slope ρ.  The end of the arrow at V = <V> locates 
Sρ which is shown as a solid square in Fig. 6.  The seat difference between Sρ and S(<V>) is 
defined as γ.  Because γ uses both responsiveness and seats, it could be described as a 
‘responsiveness&seats’ measure.  A full discussion of the merits and characteristics of this 
measure will be deferred to Section 5.2.  Here we will only note that it is computed entirely from 
data at the statewide vote <V> and so it does not employ counterfactuals. 
 
3.2.  Flaw in the β measure 
We now address the use of symmetry to estimate bias according to the measure defined as β 
in the introduction.  The S(V) curve in Fig. 6 gives S(<V>) = 0.192 for Democrats with <V> = 
0.416.  The counterfactual symmetrically opposite vote is 1 - <V> = 0.584, and at that value on 
the S(V) curve the fraction of D seats is 0.857, so the counterfactual fraction of R seats is 0.143.  
As this is less than the factual D seat S(<V>) = 0.192, the symmetric measure of bias β posits 
that TN is biased in favor of Democrats, contrary to all the other measures. As this differs from 
expectations, one might question the accuracy of our S(V) methodology.27 However, the small 
uncertainties we obtain for our S(V) curves have led us to reconsider the β measure and to 
conclude that it gets confounded in unbalanced states.   
The key to understanding the flaw in the β measure comes from the r(v) graph.  If the vote 
were to shift strongly Democratic, the entire wall of safe Republican districts would fall. This is 
in contrast to the sole highly packed Democratic district that anchors S(<V>).  A simple toy 
example illustrates this phenomenon.  Consider a state with ten districts, nine of which have 
party A preference of 0.65 and one which has party A preference of 0.25 so the state has an 
                                                     
27 Of course, our value for β was obtained from a model for shifting the vote.  The alternative uniform 
shift model essentially agrees by giving a similarly small value for β, although of the opposite sign.  It 
may also be noted that TN is unusual compared to other Republican majority states in that there was 
one election, 2006 Governor, that had a strongly Democratic vote share of 0.70.  This outlier election is 
responsible for giving the visibly large uncertainties for 0.3 < V < 0.45 in Fig. 6 and also for the rather 
larger standard errors of the mean for the districts in Fig. 5 compared to other states. Nevertheless, our 
inclusion of this election demonstrates the robustness of our S(V) curves over a large range of vote 
share. 
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overall preference <VA> = 0.61 for party A.28  Party A would then be expected to obtain nine 
seats with this set of preferences. For simplicity let us assume for the counterfactual that each 
district undergoes a uniform swing to party B by ∆V = 0.22 which achieves the counterfactual 
statewide party B preference VB = 0.61.  Then there are nine districts with party A preference of 
0.43 and one district with preference 0.03.  For simplicity, let us use first-past-the-post voting 
which would then give party B ten seats in the counterfactual.  The β measure would then draw 
the absurd conclusion that this state is biased in favor of party B because it would have obtained 
more seats if it had counterfactually received the same statewide vote fraction as party A actually 
received.29  This illustrates that by treating the two parties differently – most clearly illustrated 
by asymmetrical r(v) graphs with a significant angle of declination – map drawers can achieve 
advantage for their party while the simple β measure of symmetry suggests the opposite.  For 
comparison, a uniform shift of 0.11 to V = 0.5 would still give 9 seats to party A using first-past- 
the-post or 7.6 seats using fractional seats. 
We wish to emphasize that this section only criticizes the β measure of bias, not the 
fundamental concept that fairness requires symmetry, as will become apparent in section 5.1. 
3.3.  Texas and South Carolina 
We have also analyzed two other Republican majority states, Texas (TX) and South Carolina 
(SC). Results shown in Table 1 for the αS and αV measures for SC are similar to those for TN 
and the value of δ is even higher. The same measures for TX are somewhat smaller, but still 
biased in favor of Republicans.  In contrast, the β value is nearly zero for South Carolina and 
even would assign substantial bias in favor of Democrats in TX, again indicating that the β 
measure is flawed.30  Included here as Fig. 7 is the r(v) graph for TX.  It also exhibits a wall of 
                                                     
28 This assumes that all districts had the same number of voters, i.e., no turnout bias. Effective turnout 
bias is small in this study as is documented in Appendix A.2.  
29 Using proportional shift and fractional seats slightly alleviates the flaw in the β value by giving 9.6 
instead of 10 sets to party B in the counterfactual. We also note that other examples reveal that the 
unfairness that is not diagnosed by the β measure comes not from packing minority party districts, but 
from building a wall of majority party seats that are safe but not packed.  
30 Our data for SC and TX also differ from that of NC in that there was no statewide election won by the 
Democrats.  That means that the counterfactual S(1 - <V>) had to be extrapolated well beyond the vote 
share range of the available elections, in contrast to the less uncertain interpolation within the range of 
available vote share that was done for TN.  Nevertheless, the general shapes of the extrapolated S(V) 
curves for SC and TX are quite similar to the one for TN as shown in Fig. 8 for TX.  
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safe Republican districts in the 0.6 < V < 0.7 range, although the TX wall is not as steep or high 
as the TN wall.    
 
                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.   r(v) graph for Texas.                                     Fig. 8  S(V) graph for Texas.  
 
4.  Democratic majority states  
4.1  California and Illinois 
It is widely recognized that California (CA) has been a leading state for redistricting reform, 
so it is especially interesting to examine its congressional plan using our methods.   The r(v) 
graph in Fig. 9 is basically linear with a small value of the declination δ favoring Democrats.  
The linear fit to the r(v) data gives a slope of 2.1.  This is the same as the responsiveness ρ 
shown in the S(V) graph in Fig. 10.31  The winner’s bonus R = 2.5 for CA is considerably larger 
than proportionality (R = 1) and somewhat larger than the EG (R = 2), but still considerably 
smaller than the winner’s bonuses in TN and SC.  The αS and αV measures in CA favor 
Democrats, but less so than they favor Republicans in TX and much less than in TN and SC as 
shown in Table 1.                                                                                   
 
                                                     
31 Our S(V) curve agrees quite well with one drawn by McGann, et al. 2016,78, although our uncertainties 
are smaller.  They also provide values for the αS measure for all states in their Table 3.A.2.  Our value 
for CA is in excellent agreement and values for other states are also satisfactory considering that we use 
statewide elections and they used district elections. 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  r(v) graph for California                                  Fig. 10.  S(V) graph for California. 
 
We have also analyzed the 2011 Illinois (IL) plan. Table 1 shows that the IL plan is 
somewhat more responsive than CA; that gives a relatively larger Democratic seat fraction in IL 
because both states have nearly the same average <V> vote.  Its r(v) graph is not as linear as for 
CA, but its δ is smaller and even favors Republicans.  There appears to be a soft wall of six 
Democratic districts centered near 0.43 R vote in the r(v) graph, but this wall appears to be close 
enough to V = 0.5 such that, along with the extreme packing of Democrats in other Chicago 
districts, IL has small positive αS and αV values favoring Republicans.  (Supplementary material 
contains the IL graphs.)  We concur with the analysis of McDonald, et al. 2018, 323 who wrote 
“Despite the outcries of unfairness in some quarters of the press and a court seeing a ‘blatant 
political move’ …  Democrats’ self-help maneuvering was largely a matter of tamping down 
some of the pro-Republican effects of residential patterns.”  Similar comments were written by 
McGann, et al. 2016, 105. 
 
4.2  Maryland and Massachusetts 
We now turn to two other Democratic majority states that differ substantially from CA and IL 
and also from each other.  Maryland (MD) is widely regarded as having been intentionally 
gerrymandered by Democrats.  Its r(v) graph in Fig. 11 shows that the infamous CD1 is a safe 
Republican district, and CD6 leans substantially Democratic.  The complaint is that CD6 could 
be made more competitive or even leaning Republican if Democratic voters were exchanged 
with R voters in adjacent CD8.  That would shift the middle declination circle down in Fig. 11 
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which would reduce the very large negative value of δ and it would soften the already soft wall 
consisting of CD5, CD8, CD2, and CD3.   
 
                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  r(v) graph for Maryland                              Fig. 12.  S(V) graph for Maryland 
 
The S(V) curve in Fig. 12 shows that the winners bonus R is quite large but the responsiveness 
ρ is much smaller, consistent with drawing relatively safe districts for both parties.  Fig. 12 also 
shows that the αS and αV measures favor Democrats, although Table 1 shows that the 
magnitudes of these bias values are much smaller than the corresponding values for five states 
that these measures purport to be biased in favor of Republicans.  
Massachusetts (MA) has a similar two-party average vote share in our data compared to MD, 
but MA has not elected any Republicans to Congress under its 2011 plan whereas MD has 
always elected one.  The r(v) graph for MA in Fig. 13 has a highly packed Democratic district 
CD7 and a wall of eight Democratic districts with Republican support in the range 0.35 < vi < 
0.45.  A linear fit just to this wall gives a large pseudo responsiveness of 7.3.  The S(V) graph in 
Fig. 14 shows that a large winner’s bonus like R = 4.6 results in the dominant party obtaining 
nearly all the seats when <V> differs from 50% by as little as 10% of the vote.  There were 
ample elections near V = 0.5 to give credibility to the αS and αV measures which actually 
indicate bias in favor of Republicans in the 2011 MA plan.32  On the other hand, the αS and αV 
measures indicate bias for the Democrats in the MD plan, but that plan provides for one 
Republican seat whereas the MA plan essentially guarantees none.                               
                                                     
32 McGann, et al. 2016,77 and McDonald, et al. 2018,321 also noted a Republican bias in the MA plan.  
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Fig. 13.  r(v) graph for Massachusetts                          Fig. 14.  S(V) graph for Massachusetts 
 
5.  Additional ideals and measures   
The MA and MD comparison just described illustrates the difficulty with assessing bias in 
unbalanced states. We have pursued this issue in Appendix C by considering the impact of 
political geography. While we are enthusiastic about the concepts described there, the difficulty 
in carrying out the associated procedure motivates our consideration in this section of simpler 
measures in addition to the αS, αV, and β measures already introduced.   Each of these additional 
measures implies an ideal form for zero bias that will be characterized.   
5. 1   Symmetry and the global GS measure 
The concept that a district plan should treat parties symmetrically is appealing, so we have 
been disappointed that the β measure applied to S(V) curves fails as emphasized in Section 3.2.  
However, there are other ways to measure symmetry besides focusing just on the average 
statewide vote at <V> and its counterfactual at 1 - <V> as is done in the β measure.   
To motivate our measure of global symmetry (GS), let us first consider an even more basic 
definition of symmetry at the district level.  When there is a district that has a stronger preference 
for party A than the average statewide preference, then we define district-level symmetry to 
require that there be another district that has the same stronger preference for party B.  Let us 
label two such districts m and n and designate the preferences of these districts by their expected 
vote share for party A as vm and vn.  Then, if the statewide vote share is <V>, this pair of districts 
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is defined to be symmetrical when vm - <V> = <V> - vn.  Symmetry for the entire state is then 
achieved if every district is so paired.33  We will call this district symmetry, abbreviated DS. For 
our r(v) graphs, <V> is the Republican vote <VR>. 
The nearly linear r(v) graph for CA in Fig. 9 comes quite close to exhibiting DS, so it is not 
an unattainable ideal.  Indeed, any r(v) graph whose districts fall on a straight line automatically 
exhibits DS.  However, linearity is only a sufficient condition for DS, but it is not necessary.  
District symmetry only requires what is called inversion symmetry.  Inversion transforms each 
point located at r and v on the r(v) graph into a point at r' = 1 - r and v' = <V> - v.34  If a graph is 
transformed by inversion and remains identical to what it was before inversion, then we say it 
has DS.  Fig. 15 shows an r(v) graph that has three examples that have DS.  In addition to the 
linear one, there are two non-linear examples that are relevant for considering responsiveness. 
All are centered at r = 0.5 and the statewide average v = <V> which we chose to be 0.6 for the 
examples in Fig. 15.  However, the slope is quite different for these three examples at this central 
point; this slope is named ρsym in the figure legend.  The actual responsiveness ρ is essentially 
the slope at v = 0.5 because that is the midrange where districts most likely change party for 
small statewide vote swings. The legend of Fig. 15 shows values of ρsym and ρ, as well as the 
winner’s bonus R.35   
Figure 16 shows the corresponding S(V) curves which, for simplicity, are obtained by 
uniformly shifting the curves in Fig. 15 by 0.1 to the left.  Regarding responsiveness, it is 
interesting to compare ρ for the three examples in Fig. 16. When <VB> = 0.3, the plan 
represented by the dot-dash line has the largest slope and the most seats for minority party B. But 
when <VB> = 0.5, the most responsive plan is the one represented by the dashed line in Fig. 16 
and by open circles in Fig. 15. 36  
                                                     
33 For a state with an odd number of districts, at least one district would have vj = <V>. 
34 The reason for choosing the inversion center at <VR> is that this becomes the center of the S(V) graph. 
35 The slope at v = 0.5 is exactly the responsiveness if one uses the uniform swing and first-past-the-post 
voting.  Likewise, the value of the winner’s bonus R is the slope of the straight line from the 
intersections of the curves with the v = 0.5 vertical line to the central point at r = 0.5. 
36 One can also obtain a rough measure of the number of competitive districts when <VA> = 0.6 by 
counting the number of districts that lie within the window 0.45 to 0.55.  Then, the third plan shown by 
triangular symbols is least responsive, although it gives the minority party the most seats.  However, 
when we consider <V> = 0.7, that same plan is the most responsive because all the curves shift to the 
right by 0.1 which is the same as counting the number of responsive districts in a window which shifts 
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Fig. 15.  Three examples of r(v) graphs 
that have district symmetry (DS) with 
the same average statewide vote <VA> 
= 0.6 for party A.   
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
Fig. 16.  The corresponding S(VB) 
curves assuming uniform swing of the 
r(v) graphs and first-past-the-post 
estimates of seats.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that we have considered different ways that the r(v) and S(V) graphs can have DS, let 
us consider an example that does not have district symmetry to illustrate how bias can be 
measured using global symmetry GS.  The solid line in Fig. 17 shows the S(V) curve for 
Democrats in South Carolina and the dashed line shows the S(V) curve for Republicans. The two 
curves differ considerably. Recall that we defined ∆S(V) as ½ the difference SD(V) – SR(V) 
because then ∆S(½) is the αS value of bias and ∆S(<V>) is the β value. In Fig. 17 β is much 
smaller than α because <V> is close to the point where the S(V) curves for the two parties cross.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
to the left by 0.1 in the r(v) graph.  One may also define the competitiveness of individual districts 
using fractional seats probabilities, such as was done by Nagle 2019. 
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Fig. 17.  Comparison of the S(V) curves for the two parties in South Carolina. The solid line 
shows the Democratic seat fraction versus the Democratic two-party vote fraction and the 
dashed line is the corresponding curve for Republicans.  Each curve is the inversion of the 
other.  Half their difference at V = 0.5 is the αS value of bias and at V = <V> it is the β value 
of bias. The grey area between the two curves is the GS value of bias. 
If it were not for our analysis of the r(v) graphs in Section 3.2, one might say that it is unclear 
from Fig. 17 that the αS measure is more valid than the β measure.  However, in the case of 
uniform shifts the area identified by G1 in the figure where ∆S(V) is negative has identical size to 
the sum of the two areas identified by G2 and G3 where ∆S(V) is positive.37  Therefore, when the 
αS value is large, there must be crossover values of Vc ≠ ½ at which ∆S(Vc) = 0.  In the cases of 
SC, MD, and TN, <V> is close to a crossover Vc.  Similar crossover points at similar values of 
Vc also occur in states like NC, OH, and PA that are clearly biased; this is a further indication 
that αS is a better measure of bias than β.38  Nevertheless, it would be better not to have to 
choose a value of V at which to measure bias, especially when the chosen V is substantially 
different from <V>.   
                                                     
37 When the proportional shift is used to construct the S(V) curves, the equivalence of these areas is not 
exact, but it is still approximately true. 
38 Likewise, the αV votes measure of bias is better than evaluating the difference in votes required to 
obtain the same number of seats at the statewide <V>. 
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The total shaded area GS = G1  + G2  + G3 between the two S(V) curves in Fig. 17 provides 
such an alternative measure of bias that avoids this criticism of the αS and β measures.39  
Because it integrates over all values of the vote V, it does not depend on making a choice of the 
value of V as the other seats based measures do.  Because the difference between the two curves 
can also be viewed as the differences in votes needed to obtain seats, GS is best described as a 
combination of seats-based and votes-based measures.40  
5.2  New γ measure of bias  
A major concern with the αS and αV measures of bias for unbalanced states is that they do not 
evaluate near the average statewide vote <V> .  The next three subsections turn to three measures 
of bias that do evaluate exclusively at <V> and that therefore do not employ counterfactual V or 
S.  
This subsection elaborates on our γ measure newly introduced in Section 3.1 with values 
reported in Table 1 and shown graphically in various Figs. 6, 8, 12 and 14.  It is rooted on the 
basic fairness principle of half the seats for half the vote V. It calculates an ideal fraction of seats  
Sρ = 0.5 + ρ(<V>-0.5)        .           (5.2.1) 
Eq. (5.2.1) is rather like the ideal fraction of seats calculated by traditional proportional 
representation (PR) and by the efficiency gap (EG) except that PR imposes the value ρ  = 1 and 
the efficiency gap imposes ρ = 2.  However, the γ measure uses the responsiveness determined at 
V = <V>, thereby avoiding an arbitrary choice of the ρ factor, instead basing it on an empirical 
value at <V>. Then, similarly to PR and EG, the γ measure of bias is the difference between the 
ideal fraction and the measured fraction  
        γ = Sρ - S(<V>) = 0.5 + ρ(<V>-0.5) – S(<V>)   .       (5.2.2) 
                                                     
39 GS was originally named the geometric measure of bias BG (Nagle, 2015, 351) because it is the 
percentage of the geometric area within the total seats/votes box defined by 0 to 1 on both axes. Prof. 
Grofman has kindly brought to our attention that GS is a special case of one of the eight measures in 
Grofman 1983. 
40 Because the integral of the signed difference between the two curves is zero in the case of uniform shift 
and small even for proportional shift and fractional seats, GS is defined to take the absolute value of the 
difference which is the total shaded area in Fig. 17.  Which party is favored by the necessarily positive 
value of GS is then taken to favor the party favored by αS and αV. This can lead to ambiguity of the sign 
when the difference between the two curves is small, but such cases would be deemed acceptably fair 
with either sign. 
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 As γ depends upon both responsiveness and seats, it could be described as a responsiveness & 
seats or R&S bias, although writing the simple γ symbol is more convenient. It is also useful to 
recall the definition of R = (S(<V>) - 0.5)/(<V>-0.5) and rewrite 
        γ = (ρ - R)(<V> - 0.5) .                          (5.2.3) 
Another favorable feature of the γ measure is that it especially penalizes bipartisan 
gerrymandering, which is characterized by a smaller value of ρ.  In unbalanced states R is 
generally larger than ρ.  For Democratic states with <V> greater than 0.5, a smaller ρ makes γ 
even more negative, appropriately reporting more bias.  For Republican states with <V> less 
than 0.5, a smaller ρ makes γ even more positive, again appropriately reporting more bias.41    
Next, we consider what kind of S(V) curves give γ = 0.  An important class is unbiased linear 
curves that pass through the origin with whatever slope R = ρ.   CA, IL and CO are essentially in 
this class.  However, a general symmetric S(V) curve will have values of γ that vary with V, 
usually with γ becoming negative as <V> increases from 0.5.  Of greater concern is non-
symmetric curves which may have γ =0 at special values of <V>.42  The most problematic of our 
states in this regard is MA. Figure 14 shows that γ(V) = 0 at V = 0.56 and, as V increases to <V> 
= 0.6, it indicates large negative bias in favor of Democrats. Although one might be inclined to 
welcome this as a commonsense result, note that the S(V) curve eventually has to curve over at 
large V which necessarily gives a large negative γ, so we are inclined to discount this MA result.  
However, for other unbalanced, biased states like TN, γ(V) has nearly the same value for all V 
near <V> because S(V) has a nearly constant slope in that region.  We will return to a 
quantitative analysis of the γ measure for other states in Section 6.3.     
5.3  Declination measure δ    
This measure (Warrington 2017, 2019) utilizes the two solid lines that we have included in 
our r(v) graphs. Although the difference in angles δ between these two lines does not translate to 
the seats and votes quantities that most people would like to know, we like this construct because 
it visually illustrates walls of safe seats that are characteristic of unfair maps.   In this subsection 
                                                     
41 This effect also applies in balanced states. 
42 This occurs when a straight line drawn from (0.5,0.5) is tangent to the S(V) curve at V. 
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we review what the ideal declination (δ = 0) requires for S(V) partly because it has interesting 
similarities and contrasts with the measure in the next subsection.  
The basic definition of the declination depends upon just a few quantities in the r(v) graph. 
Figure 18 illustrates these quantities; rA and rB are the average ranks of those districts that are 
won by parties A and B respectively, and vA and vB are the corresponding vote shares.43  
Equating the angles of the two lines results in the ideal δ = 0.   
Figure 18.  Definitions of quantities 
rA, vA, rB and vB used to calculate 
ideal seats values for the δ 
measure of bias.  The values 
shown are the same as those for 
NC in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
When the statewide vote for party A is VA, straightforward algebra derives the following 
ideal δ = 0 relations (Campisi, et al. 2019,375, Katz, et al. 2020,175) 
       (½ - vB) - (vA – ½) = ½ - VA                                (5.3.1)  
and 
      SA - ½ = (VA - ½)/[(4vA - 2) - (2VA – 1)]      .       (5.3.2) 
                                                     
43 The rank of the middle circle is twice the average rank rB of seats won by party B, so this is SB. Note 
that the district votes won by a party can have many distributions, such as (i) all having the same value 
or (ii) all being quite different. The lines themselves are suggestive that the district votes are linear with 
their rank, but this is not generally required, although such linear r(v) graphs do result in the declination 
not varying with the statewide vote when the uniform shift is employed.  As noted earlier, we prefer to 
use fractional seats and vote shares in our calculations for Table 1, but it is convenient to use the 
simpler first-past-the-post method (Warrington 2017)  in Figure 19 and our r(v) graphs. 
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Equation (5.3.2) emphasizes that the seat fraction required for unbiased plans by the δ measure 
depends not only upon the vote VA but also upon an additional characteristic, the average vote 
vA.44  Figure 19 shows the ideal S(V) curves for two values of vA, 0.6 and 0.7.   
 
 
Figure 19.  Party A S(V) curves for 
ideal declination (δ = 0) and 
ideal lopsided outcomes (LO=0, 
next subsection) for two values 
of vA which is the average voter 
preference in districts won by 
party A.   
 
 
 
 
When VA = 0.6, Fig. 19 shows that party A wins all the districts if vA = 0.6 (dashed curve) 
compared to 2/3 of the districts if vA = 0.7 (solid curve).45    As pointed out by McGhee 2017, 
any measure that allows this kind of variation means that measure violates a primary principle 
for measuring bias, namely, that a partisan map drawer not be allowed to increase the seat 
fraction for a given vote fraction without incurring a change in the value given by the measure.46  
In the case of the declination measure, when party A is in power and expects VA > ½ , it can 
increase SA for the same VA by decreasing vA with no change in δ.  Fortunately, decreasing vA 
also increases the competitiveness of the districts and a partisan party A map drawer would be 
unlikely to reduce vA low enough to create competitive districts when party A is the majority 
party.  Unfortunately, when VA < ½, Fig. 19 shows that party A obtains more seats by having all 
districts more packed, in which case party A would encourage a bipartisan gerrymander while 
satisfying δ = 0.  
                                                     
44 Or vB, but that is determined from Eq. (7.3.1) once VA and vA are given. 
45 Using Eq. (7.3.1) the corresponding packing fractions 1- vB for party B are 0.5 and 0.4 for vA = 0.6 and 
0.7, respectfully.  These numbers emphasize that packing of party B is not allowed by the declination 
ideal. 
46 Katz, et al. 2020,175 have similarly criticized the δ measure.  
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5.4  Lopsided outcomes (LO) measure of bias 
This measure focuses on discriminatory packing. The ideal for this measure is that the excess 
vote share for districts won by party A averaged over those districts (namely, vA – ½   in the 
previous section) equals the excess vote share for districts won by party B averaged over those 
districts (namely ½ - vB). Then, the measure of packing bias is47  
                           LO = (½ - vB) -  (vA – ½)   .                                               (5.4.1)                        
A positive value of LO would indicate greater packing of party B voters and would therefore 
indicate a bias in favor of party A.   
The ideal LO = 0 and Eq. (5.4.1) require that vB = 1 - vA.  Together with the relation VA = 
vASA + vBSB, simple algebra gives the seats-votes relation, 
                       SA – ½ = (VA – ½)/2(vA – ½)               .                                (5.4.2) 
Figure 19 shows the S(V) curves for two values of vA.  Just as for the δ measure in the previous 
subsection, given statewide vote VA in an unbalanced state with VA > ½, a partisan map drawer 
could increase party A seat fraction by decreasing vA, so the LO measure, like the δ measure, 
violates the principle that a map drawer should not be able to change the seat outcome without 
incurring a change in the value given by the measure of bias.48 Although this LO measure is 
similar to the δ measure in the sense that both of their ideal curves depend upon vA, Fig. 19 
shows that they have different ideal curves.49  The ideal S(V) curve obtained from the LO 
measure is similar to the proportionality and EG measures in that it is linear.  Furthermore, its 
ideal responsiveness in Eq. (5.4.2) is ρ = R = ½(vA – ½); this relates to accommodating political 
geography which would be expected to produce smaller values of vA – ½ for more homogeneous 
states.  However, the actual value of LO is given by Eq. (5.4.1) and that depends upon ½ - vB 
which is a separate variable for states with LO ≠ 0.   
                                                     
47 The usual calculation for each party simply adds the excess vote fractions just in those districts won the 
party and divides by the number of those districts.  We use fractional seats and fractional excess votes 
for responsive districts, although differences are usually small. 
48 Similarly to the ideal δ measure, party A could increase vA in order to increase SA when VA < ½,  Katz, 
et al. 2020,174 have also published Eq. (5.4.2) and criticized the LO measure.  
49 This is also easily seen from Eq. (5.3.1) which is required for δ = 0 whereas LO = 0 requires the left-
hand side of Eq. (5.3.1) to be zero, and these two requirements differ except when VA = ½. 
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5.5  Minimal inverse responsiveness ζ 
We turn in this subsection from fairness to responsiveness because many reformers believe 
that districts should be competitive.  This would make it easier for voters to change the party in 
power, and it would provide for more robust elections.  It is therefore pertinent to consider 
maximal responsiveness as an ideal and to devise a measure of the extent to which a map does 
not satisfy the ideal.  Such a formula has to take into account a maximum ideal value ρmax.  
Clearly the maximum occurs when all the districts j have partisan preferences vj = 0.5.  Of 
course, this is only possible when the statewide vote is V = 0.5.  If one uses first-past-the-post 
elections, then a small shift in statewide vote flips all the districts; that means ρmax = ∞.  Infinity 
is not a subtractable number and that makes it awkward to quantify how a real map differs from 
the most responsive. To accommodate this, we define an inverse responsiveness measure ζ as: 
           ζ  = (1/ρ) − (1/ρmax)              .                  (5.5.1) 
Ideal responsiveness is then indicated by ζ = 0, and more responsive maps are identified as 
having smaller values of ζ. If one uses first-past-the-post, then 1/ρmax is simply zero. However, 
when the vote swings by a small amount, it is quite unlikely that all the fully competitive districts 
will swing to the same party, so it is preferable to calculate ρmax using fractional seats. For the 
fractional seats function we have used in this paper, ρmax = 10.  We consider this value of ρmax to 
be a reasonable maximum responsiveness for balanced states.  This reduces ζ by 0.1 in Eq. 
(5.5.1) compared to using first-past-the-post. 
The ideal ρmax should be modified when a state is unbalanced.50   One might then retain as 
many fully competitive vj = ½ districts as possible and pack the remaining districts with as large 
a fraction of the majority party voters as possible.  Figure 20 shows an example of a 
corresponding r(v) graph. Let us suppose that the maximum average packing of majority voters 
is vM and that this is large enough for those districts to be completely safe.  The responsiveness is 
then the product of the fraction SC of competitive districts and the responsiveness of the fully 
competitive district with partisan preference ½. When the party A vote is VA, one finds SC = (vM 
                                                     
50 In this general case, it becomes more complicated when the fractional district seat is determined as a 
continuous function of v.  For simplicity in this paragraph, we will simply use first-past-the-post to 
determine the seats when the statewide vote is VA, with ½ assigned to fully competitive districts with 
partisan preference ½.  
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– VA)/(vM - ½).51 For example, for an unbalanced state that has VA = 0.6 and vm = 0.7, SC 
decreases to ½ and the 1/ ρmax term in Eq. (5.5.1) increases to 0.2.   
It is also interesting that this model for maximal responsiveness gives the relation 
 SA – ½ = (VA - ½)/(2vM – 1)                            (5.5.2) 
when vM is large enough for completely safe districts.  This gives winners bonus R = 1/(2vM – 
1).  In the unrealistic case of being able to pack districts with all of the majority party voters (i.e. 
vM = 1), one has R = 1, like the proportional representation ideal.  For a more realistic value of 
vM like 0.75, then R = 2, like the EG ideal.  
 
Fig. 20  Suggested rank graph to maximize 
responsiveness ρ for a state with 10 
districts, maximal average majority party 
packing vM = 0.7, and average statewide 
vote VA=0.56.  
 
 
 
 
6.   Comparisons  
Now that data have been shown and various measures have been described, we come to the 
most important part of this paper in subsection 6.1 where we synthesize our results to measure 
total partisan bias in unbalanced states.  Comparison of measures that don’t work well is given in 
subsection 6.2, and the durability of measures is shown in section 6.3. 
6.1  Best measures of partisan bias in unbalanced states 
Different measures of bias measure different quantities.  The αS, β and γ measures focus on 
seat bias in the S(V) graph, the αV measure focuses on vote bias, and GS measures a 
combination of the two. Regarding the r(v) graphs, the LO measure focuses on packing districts, 
                                                     
51 This follows directly from VA = ½SC + vM(1-SC). 
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the declination δ measure is a geometric quantity that relates to both packing and cracking, and 
like the αV measure, the more traditional median minus mean (mM) (McDonald and Best 2015), 
focuses on vote bias.  Questions naturally arise: Which of these measures is best? And is there 
any agreement among them?  These questions cannot be answered by examining a single map 
for a single state.  In this subsection we show that they can be answered by comparing the 
performance of measures across multiple states.52   
The comparison is facilitated by normalizing the values obtained by the measures to a 
common scale.  This gives the graphical comparison shown in Fig. 21.  In this figure the αS, δ, γ 
and GS values were each normalized to the αV values, so the meaning of the scale in the vertical 
axis is the percentage of the Democratic vote in excess of 50% for half the seats.53   The average 
of these normalized measures is shown by the stars.  We call this composite bias and assign it the 
symbol Ω. 
 
Fig. 21.  Comparison of bias 
across states for five 
measures normalized to the 
αV measure. Mean values are 
shown by stars with 99% 
confidence ranges. The 
legend shows the values for 
each measure of the Pearson r 
correlation and the standard 
deviation relative to the state 
mean averaged over states.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
52 Although there have been many studies comparing states, we are unaware of this particular application 
to assess measures of partisan bias.  We also note that one could also address these questions by 
comparing many maps for the same state.   
53 The normalization factor for each measure was obtained by regression of its values to the α2 values. 
Standardizing disparate measures to obtain an average has also been accomplished by Stephanopoulos 
and Warshaw 2019. 
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The normalized measures shown in Fig. 21 are visually well correlated as is confirmed by the 
r values in the legend.54 All the signs agree except for the MA γ outlier which has been omitted 
from the statistics for the reasons given in Section 5.2.  We hypothesize that the average of these 
measures provides a better estimate of bias than any one of them.  We call this average the Ω 
measure and list its values in Table 1. The t-test obtains the 99% confidence ranges for Ω shown 
by the uncertainty bars in Fig. 21.  These indicate substantial partisan bias for Republicans in 
PA, NC, OH, SC, TN and TX.  At the 95% confidence level (not shown in Fig. 21), MD and CA 
are biased in favor of Democrats and MA and IL are biased in favor of Republicans.55   
For each measure the legend in Fig. 21 also shows the average value over all states of its 
standard deviation (SD) relative to the stars in Fig. 21. This individual SD of each measure 
provides an estimate of its uncertainty when it is applied separately from the other measures. At 
the 95% confidence level of two standard deviations, these SD values would indicate bias for all 
five of these measures in PA, NC, OH, SC and TN and none of them indicates bias in CO and 
CA.  In MD only the αV measure falls short of the 95% confidence level.  For the three states 
MA, IL and TX, some of the measures fall on either side of, but usually close to the 95% 
confidence level. This suggests that any one of these measures could often be an adequate 
measure of bias whenever it is inconvenient to calculate all of them.  When all five can be 
calculated, we suggest using the mean value Ω.   
6.2  Measures that don’t work in unbalanced states 
Measures that disagree numerically from the averages shown in Fig. 21 are shown in Fig. 22.  
The β value agrees well for balanced states with the starred average because <V> is nearly the 
50% that is used for the α measures.  Fig. 22 also shows values of β close to zero for unbalanced 
states which simply reiterates the point made in Section 3.2 that there has to be a crossover point 
between the S(V) curves for D and R in the unbalanced range as indicated in Fig. 17. 
The PR values derived from proportionality (see Appendix C.1 for definition) in Fig. 22 also 
agree with the other measures for balanced states, but they differ substantially in unbalanced 
states which we attribute to political geography.  Such deviations would be smaller if accurate 
                                                     
54 The pairwise comparisons of the 5 measures are also well correlated. 
55 When comparing two plans for the same state, the uncertainties are likely to be correlated for each 
measure which would reduce the uncertainty for discriminating their relative bias ranges. 
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estimates would be made of PRSMD in Eq. (C.2.1). Of course, PR is very strongly correlated with 
the winner’s bonus R in unbalanced states.56   
The LO values shown in Fig. 22 are consistent with those of other measures in balanced 
states by indicating much more bias in favor of Republicans in NC, OH and PA compared to CO.  
Instead, it has previously been noted (Wang, et al. 2018, 313) that LO is not suited for detecting 
bias in unbalanced states.  The value of LO indicates a bias in favor of Republicans in MD and 
an even larger Republican bias in IL and CA.  The Republican LO bias for CA is easily seen 
from its r(v) graph in Fig. 9.  Because CA has essentially symmetrical r(v) and S(V) graphs, 
average packing is necessarily smaller in the R won districts than in the D won districts.57 In TX, 
LO gives a bias in favor of Democrats.  Both these unlikely values suggest that LO contains a 
spurious piece for unbalanced states which makes it report too much bias in favor of the minority 
party.58  
  
 
Fig. 22.  Comparison across 
states for four measures and the 
average from Fig. 21, 
normalized to the αV measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
56 In the Democratic majority states, the appropriate correlation is between R values and negative 
PR values. 
57 This follows from the definition of LO with respect to the difference in separation of the outer open 
circles from the inner open circle in the r(v) graphs. 
58 By comparison of Eq. (5.4.1) with Eq. (5.3.1), <VD> - ½  should be subtracted from LO.  
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Values of ζ would not be expected to correlate well with any of the other values because ζ is 
a measure of responsiveness, not of partisan bias.59    Surprisingly, the heavily biased balanced 
state maps such as PA, NC and OH have smaller, more favorable values of ζ than unbalanced 
states.  This is due to their statewide Democratic vote occurring for <VD> slightly greater than ½ 
where the S(V) curve rapidly rises.  Evaluating ρ at smaller <VD> where the actual congressional 
votes occurred would make ζ larger for these states.  Even so, ζ would not be correlated with 
measures of bias in the unbalanced states.   
 
6.3  Durability   
 
It is desirable that the numerical values given by a measure of bias do not change much for 
typical maps when the vote swings by plausible percentages around the best estimate for the 
statewide average <V>.  Many measures of bias change dramatically with small changes in the 
vote when first-past-the-post estimation is used for states with a small number of districts.  We 
will call this instability.  It does not reflect the true character of a plan or of a measure of bias.  
Instability is appropriately avoided by calculating fractional seats instead.  
This subsection discusses a more fundamental type of change which is often described as 
durability (Grofman 2019, Wang, et al. 2018) and as sensitivity (Warrington 2019).  We define a 
measure to be absolutely durable if there is no change in the bias as the vote swings.60  An 
example of an absolutely durable measure of bias is the αS measure. Although αS is evaluated at 
V = ½, that evaluation is performed on the S(V) curve which doesn’t change after it is drawn for 
a map using many past elections.61 Likewise, the αV and GS measures do not depend on 
choosing a statewide vote.  Durability has also been a strong argument in favor of the median 
minus mean (mM) measure which uses the r(v) graph.62   
                                                     
59 Bipartisan gerrymandering reduces responsiveness but does not affect partisan fairness in balanced 
states.   
60 This definition neglects systematic temporal variation differentially by precinct and district.  Although 
the used data do not allow us to address precinct level changes, differential temporal variation of 
districts is contraindicated by the relative stability of their rankings over different elections. 
61 The S(V) curves we calculate are quite insensitive to large variations in V as seen by the small 
uncertainties in our S(V) figures.   
62 The mM measure is durable insofar as the median district vote swings equally with the statewide vote 
when the uniform shift is employed, and that is only marginally changed when proportional shift is 
employed for typical swings.  The mM values do depend delicately on a single median district 
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Other measures of bias are not absolutely durable.  Non-durability of the δ, PR, EG, ζ, LO and 
γ measures is examined for NC in Fig. 23 and for TN in Fig. 24. These two figures illustrate that 
none of these measures is durable for all states.63  While the LO measure is most durable for NC, 
it is least durable for TN.  The PR and γ measures are most durable for TN, but PR is least 
durable for NC while Fig. 12 shows durability concerns for γ in MA.  The δ measure is fairly 
durable for TN, although it varies more for NC.  Of course, one way to superficially make these 
measures durable would be to average over a range of V centered on <V>.  However, such 
averaging tends to bring the value of bias back to what is obtained just using the central value 
obtained at <V>, so the intrinsic non-durability remains. This argues in favor of using the 
durable measures of bias mentioned in the previous paragraph.  The ζ measure of the departure 
from ideal responsiveness defined by Eq. (5.5.1) is not constant in Figs. 23 and 24, simply 
because the S(V) curves are not linear.  For CA, which has nearly linear S(V) and r(v) graphs, 
the γ, ζ and δ  measures are quite durable.  
 
Figure 23.  Non-durability of five 
measures of partisan bias and the ζ 
measure of responsiveness applied to the 
2011 enacted map for NC, normalized to 
1 at V = <V>.  Actual values at <V> are 
shown in Table 1.                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
compared to the conceptually similar αV measure, so we include only the latter in our set of core 
measures.   
63 The numerical values of the different measures are quite different which leads us to normalize all the 
values to unity at V = <V>.  An exception is made for LO in TN because its value is nearly zero at 
<V>; the graph shows 1+10LO, which emphasizes that LO changes sign in this range of V. 
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Figure 24.  Non-durability of five 
measures of partisan bias and the ζ 
measure of responsiveness applied to 
the 2011 enacted map for TN, 
normalized to 1 at V = <V> except for 
the LO measure (see FN 62).  Actual 
values at <V> are shown in Table 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
7.  Discussion   
We preface this discussion by reminding the reader that our measures of bias are for total 
partisan bias, whatever its provenance. Overtly intended gerrymandering is just one part.  
Another part is un-remediated bias due to a state’s political geography and its map-drawing 
rules.  
7.1  Balanced states 
Although the primary focus of this paper is on unbalanced states that lean strongly towards 
one party, it is important to emphasize that the thorny issues that arise for such states do not 
much affect balanced states.  It does not matter whether one prefers proportionality (PR) or the 
efficiency gap (EG) (McGhee 2014) or the cubic law (Kendall and Stuart 1950) or bilogits (King 
1989); when the vote share is close to 50%, they all converge on the unassailable criterion of 
50% seat share for 50% vote share.  While vote share is never precisely 50%, we have shown 
that many measures of bias agree rather well with each other for the 2011 plans of the four nearly 
balanced states CO, PA, NC, and OH.   
Fig. 21 shows this agreement for the seats-based measure αS, the votes-based measure αV, 
the geometric declination measure δ, a global symmetry measure GS, and a new responsiveness 
& seats-based measure γ.  Figure 22 extends this agreement to the LO packing measure, the 
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proportionality measure PR, and the extended symmetry measure β.64  This agreement is 
revealed in these figures by normalizing the values obtained in Table 1.  Different measures 
provide values for different quantities, such as angles for the δ measure, seats for the αS measure, 
and votes for the αV measure. These quantities provide different perspectives on the underlying 
bias. These quantities naturally have different scales, nearly 60 degrees for δ and only 5% for αV.  
Normalization provides a common scale that allows one more easily to compare different 
measures.   
The agreement in this paper of many measures of bias for balanced states confirms the 
unsurprising conclusion that the enacted 2011 plans in NC, OH, and PA are highly biased in 
favor of Republicans.  The same analysis also reveals that the CO plan is quite fair.  All this 
reassures map drawers that measuring bias in balanced states is quite achievable with a wide 
range of measures. 
7.2  Measures of bias for unbalanced states 
The preceding fine agreement of the normalized values obtained for all measures of bias 
when applied to balanced states only holds for some of those measures when applied to 
unbalanced states.  Figure 21 in Section 6.1 shows agreement for the seats-based measure αS, the 
votes-based measure αV, the geometric declination measure δ, a global symmetry measure GS, 
and a new measure γ that uses both seats and responsiveness at the average vote <V>.  We will 
call these the core measures and we propose that any one of these could be used to measure bias 
in unbalanced states.  This is a key finding in this paper.  
While the αS, αV, GS, and γ measures all use the S(V) curves that shift the primary r(v) data 
and employ fractional seats, the δ measure relies only on the primary r(v) data.65  The δ measure 
ideal is subject to manipulation as shown by Fig. 19, but it is best at quantifying walls of safe, 
but not packed, districts favoring one party that are visually apparent in the r(v) graphs. As 
shown in Figs. 23 and 24 in Section 6.3, values of bias obtained from the δ and γ measure 
depend upon the average vote <V>, so they are free of counterfactuals. However, they are not as 
                                                     
64 One can add the efficiency gap measure EG to this list as its bias values are very near the same as the 
proportionality PR values for these balanced states.  
65 Nagle 2019 has criticized the δ measure for being unstable, but our use of fractional seats makes it 
stable. Warrington 2019 has instead proposed adding fictitious buffer districts to achieve stability. 
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durable as the other three S(V) based measures. The αS and the αV values are absolutely durable 
but only because they are evaluated near the center of the S(V) curve, which is displaced from 
the statewide vote for unbalanced states.  However, the S(V) curves for unbalanced states like 
SC, TN and TX that have strongly biased values of αS and αV have quite similar shape to those 
of NC, OH and PA whose values of αS and αV clearly show bias according to the fundamental 
principle that half the seats should be obtained for half the vote.  The αS and γ measures give a 
relatable quantity, seat bias, and the αV measure gives vote bias, whereas the δ and GS quantities 
are more abstract.  The normative principle for the αS, αV and γ measures is the fundamental half 
the seats for half the vote, whereas the normative principal for the δ and GS measures is 
symmetry.  GS measures absolute asymmetry over the whole range of the S(V) curve, but which 
party is biased against requires appealing to one of the other measures.  Although none of these 
five measures is the silver bullet for evaluating bias in unbalanced states, we propose that 
together, like buckshot, they are sufficient to indicate, by their numerical agreement, that 
measuring bias is not limited to balanced states.  This then leads us to consider a suitably 
normalized average, the composite measure Ω, which we suggest is better than any of the 
individual measures from which it is composed.66  
7.3  Two rejected measures of bias for unbalanced states 
The β measure of bias is based on a symmetry principle that seems so plausible that we were 
shocked to see that it does not work in states with a dominant party.  Fig. 22 shows that β has 
small values for all the unbalanced states.  In section 3.2 we show how and why this occurs 
based on examination of the r(v) graphs. Those graphs are highly asymmetric as seen by their 
values of δ, but they lead to S(V) curves that are necessarily rather symmetric, but only near the 
value <V> for unbalanced states.  For other values of V, especially those for which values of αS, 
αV and GS are obtained, the S(V) curves are highly asymmetric. That is why these are better 
measures of bias than β. Withdrawing confidence in the β measure does not repudiate the 
concept that symmetry between parties is the ideal. It simply means that a broader notion of 
symmetry is required.  Section 5.1 defines district symmetry (DS) in the r(v) graph, and then 
                                                     
66 Averaging the five basic measures into Ω also provides estimates of uncertainty as shown in Fig. 21. 
Notice that these uncertainties are different than the generally smaller statistical uncertainties in the five 
basic measures which arise from the different statewide elections. 
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points out that deviation from symmetry is provided by the GS measure of bias.  Of course, the δ 
measure directly illustrates deviations from symmetry in the r(v) data.  The αS and αV measures 
zoom in on the central portion of the S(V) curve where asymmetry is robustly apparent.  The γ 
measure only uses the symmetry principle at the 50/50 point along with counterfactual-free data. 
The LO motivation of focusing on packing looks attractive a priori.  However, values of LO 
bias in Fig. 22 would claim that CA and IL are strongly biased in favor of Republicans while TN 
is fair and TX is biased in favor of Democrats, disagreeing strongly with the values obtained by 
our core measures. Section 5.4 argues that this indicates a systematic artifact that assigns too 
much bias in favor of the minority party in unbalanced states.    
7.4  Proportional Ideal   
In Appendix C.1 an argument is reiterated that proportionality is the ideal fair representation 
for partisan groups of voters and that the PR measure defined as S - V is the appropriate measure 
of bias.  But then in Appendix C.2 the well-known incompatibility of proportionality and the 
single member district system due to partisan geography is reiterated. In particular, MA is an 
example of a state where relative geographic uniformity of partisan voters makes it essentially 
impossible to draw congressional districts that would durably give Republicans a proportional 
share.   
A redistricting procedure based on the proportionality ideal would be to find plans that come 
closest to satisfying proportionality for the most likely vote share <V>.67  As emphasized by the 
example of PA (Nagle 2019), a serious drawback is a state imposing constraints on the set of 
acceptable plans that makes it impossible to achieve a fair map. Furthermore, the ensuing PRP 
estimate of bias defined in Appendix C.2 can’t be obtained just from a plan itself but requires 
drawing many other possible maps. That is impracticable and certainly limits the number of 
people who could evaluate maps they have drawn.  
Of course, researchers are now capable of generating ensembles of many maps by using 
various computer simulation techniques.  As described in the introduction, often that is done to 
                                                     
67 Since there would be other maps that would grant the majority party a larger winner’s bonus R, we are 
aware that it may be deemed naïve even to suggest such a criterion.  However, a criterion that would 
guarantee minority party seats, by packing minority party voters if necessary, has recently been 
favorably discussed by Katz, et al. 2020, Appendix B.  
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establish benchmarks or baselines that give average values of bias and then measuring 
intentional bias as differences from the baseline average. This has been used for court cases to 
evaluate intentional gerrymandering, but that is not what PRp in Section C.2 attempts to measure.  
It measures bias as the difference from the plan that comes closest to proportionality, and that 
putatively fairest plan may even be an extreme outlier in the set of computer generated plans 
when a state’s political geography favors one party.68 This is consistent with the quote at the end 
of section 4.1 from McDonald, et al. 2018,323 to the effect that the Illinois legislature drew an 
outlier map in 2011 that turned out to be rather fair.  The challenge with implementing this 
approach is in determining what is the fairest possible plan with respect to proportionality.  For 
that reason, in the body of this paper we have retreated to our five core measures αS. αV. δ. γ and 
GS and their composite Ω that appear to measure total bias reliably without this complication 
and the related complication of having to consider political geography and its interaction with the 
state’s rules for map drawing.  
7.5  Responsiveness 
We have considered several quantities related to responsiveness. The basic one is ρ; it 
measures how responsive the plan is at the expected value of the statewide preference <V>.  
Bipartisan gerrymanders that lock in safe seats for either party have small values of ρ, so it is an 
important measure for reformers. It is most easily measured from the S(V) curve.  Table 1 shows 
values of ρ that are suspiciously small for MD, SC, TN, and TX. We have also defined a 
reciprocal responsiveness measure ζ in section 5.5 that allows comparison of a plan to a realistic 
maximum responsiveness that takes into account the difference between unbalanced and 
balanced states.  This responsiveness measure is not well correlated with bias, reaffirming that 
fairness and responsiveness are two separate quantities (King and Browning 1987).  
An overall responsiveness R is the relevant quantity for assessing anti-majoritarian outcome 
in balanced states and the winner’s bonus in unbalanced states.  In the latter case a large value of 
R is associated with unfairness to the minority party as in MA, MD, SC, and TN, but it likely has 
a minimum value that depends on the political geography of a state.  This measure of 
responsiveness is therefore entangled with bias in both balanced and unbalanced states.  
                                                     
68 Cf. the introduction and footnote 3.  Also, note that this section applies equally to other measures like 
the efficiency gap that has an ideal S(V) curve. 
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The ratio ρ/R is also of interest; a ratio near 1 in unbalanced states, such as CA and IL, 
follows from their linear district symmetry (DS) as seen in Section 5.1. Bipartisan 
gerrymandering in unbalanced states reduces ρ/R by reducing ρ.  This ratio is also small in 
balanced states that are biased because R is generally large and even negative for anti-
majoritarian states like PA, NC, and OH.  
Another measure of responsiveness that we have not focused on is the fraction of competitive 
districts.  A rough way to estimate this is to multiply ρ by a competitive range of votes, typically 
10%.69 It is somewhat discouraging that this means that there would only be 20% competitive 
districts even with ρ = 2 super proportional responsiveness. In any case, the S(V) curve is the 
most appropriate vehicle to assess responsiveness/competitiveness.   
7.6  Future application to redistricting 
In order to focus on the thorny issue of measuring bias in unbalanced states, this paper has 
performed an analysis across states using the single 2011 plan for each state.  Moving forward to 
redistricting in 2021, we propose using five core measures in all states for the purpose of 
comparing the bias in different proposed plans.  Although any one of these measures would 
provide an estimate of the total bias, a better estimate would average their normalized values as 
in our composite Ω measure.  The normalization factors we obtain from our analysis across 
states are, for normalization to the αV measure, 0.21 for αS, 0.083 for δ, 0.66 for GS, and 0.17 for 
γ. These would provide a first approximation for new maps in a state.  However, it is quite likely 
that these normalization factors will be different for different states.  For example, 12 maps were 
analyzed for αS and αV using the same 7s election data in Table 1 in Nagle 2019,69.  Regression 
on these data gives a normalization of 0.31 for the normalization of αS to αV, rather larger than 
the above value of 0.21.  Therefore, as more maps are drawn, more precise values of the 
normalization factors can be obtained.70  The main result of this paper remains the identification 
of the core measures of bias for all states and the analysis that devises a composite measure Ω. 
 
                                                     
69 Better than a fixed range with a sharp cutoff is a gradual fractional district measure Nagle 2019. 
70 Furthermore, following up on footnote 54, estimates in the difference of the bias between two plans 
should be addressed using Student’s t-test on the differences in the values of the five normalized 
measures. 
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8.  Conclusion 
Based on the results in this paper, we propose that total partisan bias can be measured 
reliably for the problematic unbalanced states as well as for balanced states.  Any or all of the 
five core measures or their composite Ω measure can be used with past election results to assess 
partisan bias in maps drawn by redistricting commissions, in maps drawn by individuals using 
various map drawing software, and in maps drawn by computer algorithms. Furthermore, 
responsiveness can also be obtained immediately from S(V) graphs.  Measures of fairness and 
responsiveness that are perceived to be reliable would encourage the enactment of election law 
that would include these fundamental concepts, and in a form that could have justiciable bite.  
 
 
 
Appendix A.  Data  
A.1  Source. 
The data come from statewide election returns compiled and disaggregated to voter tabulation 
districts (VTDs) by Stephen Wolf at Daily Kos Wolf 2014.  Since U.S. elections at all levels are 
administered by county or local governments, Wolf disaggregated county level returns to assign 
votes to VTDs.  While this is not ideal, first order discrepancies were avoided by using available 
votes cast in the VTD in the 2008 presidential election and the proportion of the county’s 
population living in a VTD.  McDonald, et al. 2018 have reported that Wolf’s disaggregation 
method was sufficiently accurate by comparison to VTD level data that were available in several 
states.  Even if Wolf’s data were deemed unsuitable to determine bias for the actual states in 
question, these data are sufficient to test measures of bias as this can be done for any consistent 
set of data.  Elections that had significant third-party votes were not used.  The statewide 
elections that were used are given in the following table.  These elections and results are in the 
research/elections directory of this GitHub repository: https://github.com/dra2020/nagle. 
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Table A.1  Used statewide elections for each state as well as a downballot composite for each 
state.    
A.2.  Calculations for r(v) and S(V) graphs 
For each congressional district j in each election we calculated the two-party Democratic 
vote fraction vj = D vote / (D vote plus R vote).  For each district, the average vote fraction and 
the standard error of the mean was calculated and plotted in the r(v) graphs.  The statewide two-
party vote fraction in each election was calculated in two ways: 1) the average of the district vote 
fractions and 2) the actual two-party vote fractions in the state.  The difference of 1) minus 2) is 
the turnout bias (McDonald 2009).  Table A.2 shows values for the CA elections that we used.  
Table A.3 shows average values of turnout bias for all analyzed states. 
 
    
  
Table A.2  Average statewide vote <V> and turnout bias for CA elections 
 
 
 
    Table A.3  Average turnout bias for all states.  
Because turnout bias is small, it has been ignored in the main text where the tables and figures 
show 2) the actual two-party vote fractions.  
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For each election ε a seats/vote Sε(V) graph was calculated for statewide vote Vk from 25% 
to 75% in intervals of 0.5%.  For each Vk a voter preference vj(Vk) was calculated for each 
district j using a proportional shift from the factual vj(<V>) as defined by Nagle 2015, 2019.  
When the shifted statewide party preference Vk for party A is smaller than <V>, party A voters 
in each district are shifted to party B.  The proportional shift shifts the same fraction of party A 
voters in each district.  In contrast, the uniform shift shifts the same fraction of total voters from 
party A to party B regardless of how few party A voters there may be.71  The fraction of a seat 
estimated for each shifted district was then calculated using party seat probability P(V) = 1 – 
0.5*(1 + prob((V – 0.5)/0.04)) where prob is the usual probit function, here with variance 0.04.72  
The sum of seat fractions over all districts was then Sε(V) for that election.  Figure A.1 shows 
Sε(V) curves for several elections in CA.  Then, the S(V) curve is the average of the Sε(V) curves 
and the error bars in the S(V) graphs are the standard error of the means at each V.  Finally, solid 
circles in the S(V) figures show Sε(Vε) where, for each statewide election ε,Vε is the statewide 
vote and Sε is the average sum of district fractional seats.  Differences between the individual 
Sε(Vε) and S(Vε) are another measure of the uncertainty of our estimates.   
 
Fig. A.1  Solid circles show 
seats Sε(Vε) for nine CA 
elections ε from whose 
district votes are obtained the 
shifted Democratic Sε(V) 
curves. Averaging gives the 
mean S(V) curve shown with 
standard deviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
71 The uniform shift can obviously result in districts with less than 0% or greater than 100% preferences, 
but that can’t happen with the proportional shift. 
72 For example, this function estimates that a district with 55% preference for party A has a seat likelihood 
of 10.5% for party B as shown in Fig. 1 in Nagle 2019.  
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Appendix B.  Comparison of proportional and uniform methods for shifting 
vote shares 
It has long been recognized that reliable extrapolations can be made by shifting the vote that 
is obtained in actual elections.  The simplest way to do this, much used over the years, is the 
uniform shift method which shifts every precinct and every district by the same percentage as the 
shift V - <V> in the statewide vote.  While this time-honored method is likely to be reliable for 
competitive districts j with vj close to 0.5, it has the obvious flaw for unbalanced districts that vj 
may become greater than 1 or less than 0 (King 1989), so we employ the proportional shift 
method.  This is based on the more plausible model that it is equally likely that any voter 
anywhere in the state is equally likely to shift his/her vote in the same proportion as the statewide 
shift.  Of course, this is a model.  It is quite likely that some precincts have such strong partisan 
preferences that hardly anyone will vote differently when the statewide vote changes and other 
precincts will be more responsive than average.  We have done a cursory analysis that suggests 
that such differences tend to average out at the level of congressional districts when many 
elections are considered, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.  The purpose of this appendix 
is simply to show how the S(V) curves compare for the two different models.73 
Figure B.1 shows the comparison for PA.  As expected, both methods agree with each other 
and with the actual election results in the actual vote range.  The difference for large shifts is also 
expected.  The uniformly shifted S(V) only goes to 0 when the statewide shift away from 
Democrats is large enough to shift the most Democratic districts to become safe Republican (this 
also shifts some Republican districts to have more than 100% Republican voters).  In contrast, as 
the statewide vote shifts against Democrats using a proportional shift, the most Democratic 
districts lose Democratic voters more rapidly, so the Democratic proportional shift S(V) curve 
lies below the uniformly shifted S(V) curve for small V.  Similarly, as the vote shifts toward 
Democrats it takes a larger statewide shift for the most Republican districts to become 
Democratic, so the uniform shift S(V) lies below the proportional shift S(V) for large V. 
Fig. B.2 for CA shows the same differences between the uniform shift and the proportional 
shift as Fig. B.1.  Fig. B.2 also shows β(V) where 0.5 has been added to β in order to centralize 
                                                     
73 Katz, et al. 2020,172 have recently noted that that proportional swing has three times the error of 
uniform swing in their data base.  The errors are smaller and more nearly equal for the two methods in 
our analysis.  
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the curves on the same figure.  The proportionally shifted β(V) reverses sign as V increases from 
0.5 where it is equal to αS and slightly favors Democrats to <V>=0.6 where it would indicate 
bias in favor of Republicans, contrary to all our core measures in Section 7 as shown in Table 1 
in the main text. The uniformly shifted β(V) follows the same course with V but its magnitude is 
much smaller at <V> than the proportional shift because S(V) is larger at the counterfactual V = 
1 - <V>.  For other states the sign is even different as shown in Table B.1.  Such large 
differences in the results using two plausible models for shifting votes is further reason not to 
trust the β measure of bias. The αS measure is clearly better as Table B.1 shows that its values 
have the same sign in each state for both shifting methods, although the magnitudes do differ, 
most in TX where votes in the actual elections require the greatest extrapolation to V = 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     
Fig. B.1  S(V) for two shift models in PA                     Fig. B.2.  S(V) for two shift models in CA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.1.  Percentage values for α and β for unbalanced states as determined using proportional 
shift and uniform shift.   
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Appendix C.   Proportionality vs. Political Geography and the SMD System   
C.1  The proportionality ideal 
Proportionality is widely recognized as the ideal in countries that use a list or mixed member 
proportional system to determine the fraction of seats awarded to different parties, but courts 
have not recognized it in the United States.  Indeed, SCOTUS opinions have specifically denied 
that proportionality has constitutional support.74 A more cogent argument against proportionality 
is that it is not generally achievable over a wide range of the vote in the SMD system.  A 
counterargument is that proportionality only has to be achievable over the expected range of the 
vote in each state.  We will come back to achievability in the next subsection.    
Let us we review why proportionality can be considered the ideal, even in an SMD system.  
We begin with the assertion that each voter should be represented equally as any other voter.  
Two voters of like-mind in the same district with the same representative clearly have equal 
representation, but that is different from the representation of a voter of opposite mind in the 
same district. That is an unfortunate feature of the SMD system of representation. Nevertheless, 
groups of voters of like-mind can still be represented equally on average in the SMD system and 
that is how one can argue for proportionality as the ideal.75  In this view representatives are 
shared among voters, so the empowerment of each voter of like-mind is the number of 
representatives of the like-minded party divided by the number of voters who voted for that 
party.  Let us designate S and V as the fraction of seats and voters for party A and 1-S and 1-V as 
the fractions for the other party B.  Then, the share of representation per voter of the two parties 
is just S/V and (1-S)/(1-V) respectively.  Requiring equal shares for voters in both groups and 
trivial algebra then requires S = V, which is just proportionality.76   In terms of measures of 
responsiveness, this is R = ρ = 1. 
If proportionality is the democratic ideal, that suggests a simple measure of bias, namely,   
                                                     
74 We disagree with such rulings.  AR is currently drafting a paper that argues that the constitution 
requires proportionality. 
75 Brief Amici Curiae of Common Cause and the Campaign Legal Center, Inc, Shapiro v. McManus,14-
990 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2015). 
76 Note that one can also generalize this in two ways.  First, even representatives of the opposite party 
provide representation for a voter of the opposite party, just not as much; although the algebra is more 
complicated, proportionality again ensues.  Second, one can derive proportionality for any number of 
parties.   
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   PR = S(<V>) - <V>  .                             (C.1.1) 
This evaluation is only performed at the average vote share <V> in an attempt to avoid the 
achievability problem of demanding proportionality over a wide V range. The PR values for the 
states we have analyzed are shown in Table 177.  
The PR measure is related to overall responsiveness R by 
  PR = (R -1)(<V> - ½)  ,  (C.1.2) 
which shows that PR depends both on the winner’s bonus R and the state imbalance <V> - ½.78 
Another theoretical ideal is provided by the efficiency gap (EG) principle that the wasted 
votes should be equal for both parties.   This results in R = ρ = 2.  Other variations have also 
been discussed Nagle 2017.  Historical averages give values of R near 2.  This has suggested that 
idealizing an R =2 might take into account the effect of the SMD system. Then one has the well-
known EG measure of bias (McGhee 2014),79 
EG = (S(<V>) - ½) - 2(<V> - ½)  .                             (C.1.3) 
Like the PR measure, EG also depends upon R and <V> - ½ according to EG = (R -2)(<V> - ½). 
 
C.2  Political geography and a modified proportionality measure 
The end of Section 4.2 essentially asks a question: Why should MD be generally 
acknowledged to have been gerrymandered whereas MA is not so considered when the estimated 
4% fraction of Republican seats in MA is so much smaller than the 14.3% fraction in MD for the 
nearly identical 60% partisan imbalance in both states?  This question can be reframed in terms 
of the quantitative measures in the previous subsection.  Why should the MD plan not be 
considered fairer than the MA plan when MD has smaller PR bias80 than MA if the value PR = 0 
is to be considered the ideal based on proportionality. One answer could be simply that PR may 
                                                     
77 Regarding the sign of PR, when Republican values are inserted for S and <V> as is done in Table 1, 
then positive values of PR mean bias in favor of Republicans.   
78 Eq. (C.1.2) emphasizes how PR varies with R for a state’s relative vote share. However, the factor 
(<V> - ½) is crucial when considering balanced states as its small value drives R into negative, anti-
majoritarian values when the state is biased as seen for NC, OH, and PA in Table 1.    
79 Although the EG was originally expressed in terms of wasted votes, this form is equivalent when 
turnout bias is zero, and this is the form that properly accommodates turnout bias Cover 2018, McGhee 
2017, Katz, et al. 2020. 
80 MD also has smaller γ2 bias. 
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not be a good measure of bias.   We next consider a more nuanced answer to this question that 
takes into account the contribution of political geography in the SMD system to the PR measure. 
If the political complexion of an unbalanced state is homogeneous, then any map must lead 
to the dominant party winning all the seats.  We believe that this is close to being the case for 
MA because we have been unable to draw even one reasonable looking Republican leaning 
district in MA.81  In contrast, the 2011 MD plan clearly showed that it was possible to draw a 
map with a strongly Republican district.  While the MD plan is fairer to its minority party voters 
by conforming better to proportionality than MA, one clearly can’t blame the makers of the MA 
plan for an unfair map if it was absurd to draw even one Republican district.  In the case of MA, 
we suggest that its large value of PR bias can mostly be attributed to its relatively homogeneous 
political geography interacting with the SMD system.  
In other unbalanced states it is certainly possible to draw some districts that are favorable to 
the minority party, but it still may not be possible to achieve PR = 0 due to their political 
geography.  In that case, the fairest achievable plan would be the one that minimizes the absolute 
value of PR given the political geography of the state.  We suggest that the value of PR that is 
closest to zero be called PRSMD because it is a bias due, not to intentional gerrymandering, but to 
the incompatibility of the SMD system with proportionality. For maps that do not achieve the 
γSMD value, that value could then be subtracted to obtain an effective plan bias 
 PRP = PR - PRSMD.       (C.2.1)                                                                                    
PRP can then be compared for plans within each state and also to compare plans enacted by 
different states.   
Let us illustrate how this proposal works for MA.  For MA, Table 1 shows PR = - 36% which 
is implausibly even larger than the Republican γ advantage in balanced, clearly biased states NC, 
PA and OH.  Let us consider as a rough estimate made from drawing a few maps and informed 
by the results of Duchin, et al. 2019 that about one durable and acceptable looking Republican 
                                                     
81 Duchin, et al. 2019 have shown rigorously that it is impossible to draw any district that would have 
elected a Republican based on 5 statewide elections in the 2002-2010 cycle.  They also reported that 
MA has become more heterogeneous, and we have used the districtr software program to draw a 
contiguous, although not ‘reasonable looking’, district that had substantial Republican preference in all 
of the 8 statewide election results after 2008.  
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majority district can be drawn in MA.  If so, then the maximum fraction of Republican seats at 
VR = 40% is 1/9 and PRSMD = (1/9) – 0.40 = -29%.  Then, the modified bias is PRP = -36% - (-
29%) = - 7%.  This is considerably smaller in magnitude and more realistic looking than the 
unmodified PR = - 36%.  
This MA example indicates that the absolute values of γ for other unbalanced states in Table 
C.1 may also be too large and require similar modification to take account of political 
geography. Consistency then suggests that a similar modification should also apply to balanced 
states, so we turn next to PA where we uncover cautionary concerns.  Substantial numbers of 
maps for PA were drawn for the recent court case which overturned the 2011 Congressional 
map.  Those maps were drawn under the tight constraint that the number of county splits was to 
be minimized.82  Under those constraints, Nagle 2019 estimated that the maximum number of 
Democratic seats would be 7.5 for 50% Democratic two-party vote .83  One might then suggest 
that PRSMD = (18-7.5)/18 – 0.5 = 8% using 50% vote.  The problem with accepting this in Eq. 
(C.2.1) is that any PA plan with 58% R seats for 50% vote would be assigned zero bias (PRp = 
PR - PRSMD = 0) while strongly violating the most fundamental fairness criterion of 50% seats 
for 50% vote. The root cause for not being able to draw a fair PA map with more than 7.5 seats 
for 50% vote is simply the tight county split constraint imposed by the PA Supreme Court on 
acceptable maps.  It was shown that loosening the county split criterion allowed a fair map to be 
drawn (Nagle 2019).  That having been done, then the minimum absolute value of PRSMD is 0 
and only PA plans that satisfy the fundamental 50/50 fairness criterion have PRp = 0.  While this 
shows that consistency can be established in PA in the context of this PRp modified measure, it 
emphasizes the importance of the constraints imposed on acceptable maps and concern over how 
that choice is made. 
Recapitulating what we learn from the MA and PA examples, the underlying goal of the 
proportionality ideal is to assign bias to a plan whenever proportionality is not achieved without 
                                                     
82 PA practice requires population deviation not to exceed one person; then the minimal number of county 
splits has to be precisely the number of districts minus one, barring some highly improbable set of 
county populations. http://lipid.phys.cmu.edu/nagle/Technical/Theorem-splits.docx. Note also that the 
number of county splits is not the same as the number of split counties, e.g. one county split between 
three districts counts as two splits. 
83 The estimate for the 2018 adopted PA map was 7 D seats for 50% of the vote (α = 11%) and 9 seats for 
53.6% of the vote (α2 = 3.6%) which indeed was the 2018 outcome. Cervas and Grofman 2020,9 have 
estimated 7.8 D seats for 50% of the vote for the adopted map. 
50 
 
regard for the source of the bias.  The PRp modification attempts to remove that part of the bias 
that can be attributed to the SMD system which usually brings about a winner’s bonus R greater 
than the proportionality ideal R = 1; Eq. (C.1.2) shows this effect.  The primary goal of the PRp 
modification is to enable proportionality values for unbalanced states to appear consistent with 
values obtained for balanced states which do not need such a modification.84   
C.3  Survey of other states 
We have not attempted to estimate γSMD for other states.85  Instead, let us just qualitatively 
discuss which of those states might have had fairer maps.  For this we will refer to a quantitative 
measure of heterogeneity in the political geography (PG) of states recently devised by Chen and 
Rodden 2018. Their primary goal is to measure the difference in PG between parties.  For most 
states they find that the average Democratic voter is more likely than the average Republican 
voter to reside in a congressional sized neighborhood (Eubank and Rodden 2019) that has a high 
fraction of same party voters.  This difference in the political geography of the parties leads to 
natural packing of Democratic voters and partisan bias if not remediated.86  Chen and Rodden 
found that MD has the largest difference between parties, strongly favoring Republicans, and 
MA has one of the smallest differences.  This is not exactly what we would like to know in order 
to understand why MA must have nearly all Democratic seats while MD need not.  Nevertheless, 
we will use the sum of their heterogeneities for both parties as a qualitative proxy for the overall 
heterogeneity of a state. We will call this the PGS measure.  From our discussion of MA, it is 
also relevant to consider just the heterogeneity of Republicans in Democratic dominated states, 
which we will call PGR, and the heterogeneity of Democrats in Republican dominated states, 
which we designate PGD.  We also show values for these measures of PG in Table C.1.    
The larger value of PGS for MD than for MA generally suggests that the political geography 
of MD is more heterogeneous than that of MA.  The small value of PGS and PGR for MA is 
                                                     
84 For a balanced state, Eq. (C.1.2) shows that any plausible value of the winner’s bonus does not 
contribute significantly to PR because the <V> - ½ factor is small.  For balanced states NC, OH and 
PA, the actual PR bias is due to the large negative anti-majoritarian values of R.  We also note that a 
redefinition of R to be the slope of the vector from the V=50% point on the S(V) curve instead of from 
the (50,50) center leads one back to the αS measure.  
85 Estimates of PRSMD will undoubtedly be obtained by minority party map drawers in the next round of 
redistricting.  
86 Unintentional gerrymandering can be considered to be a consequence of politically geography and the 
SMD system under the legal and conventional constraints imposed on drawing maps.   
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consistent with the difficulty we had drawing a single Republican district in MA.  However, the 
PGR heterogeneity of Republicans in MD isn’t very much larger than in MA, although it is far 
smaller than the average heterogeneity of Democrats.87    Although MD has one Republican 
district, it is packed to over 60% R, and the state’s large PGS suggests that that district could be 
made more responsive along with one or more of the currently Democratic districts.88 These 
considerations suggest that MD is more biased than MA.  However, the relatively small PGR 
suggests that it is unlikely that the proportional ideal of 3 R seats could be achieved.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1.  The last three columns give values for the political geography of states from Chen 
and Rodden 2018.  The PR column shows values obtained from the proportionality measure.  
The definitions of the preceding columns are given in the Table 1 caption. All values are 
percentages except for R and ρ which are the slopes shown on the S(V) graphs. 
The other two unbalanced D states in Table C.1, CA and IL, both have much larger PGR and 
PGS than MA, consistent with their smaller values of PR.  It is difficult to judge whether the 
political geography of CA would allow a smaller PR value. Βut it seems likely that the fraction 
of Democratic seats in IL could have been smaller, thereby reducing its PR, consistent with its 
larger PGR and PGS compared to CA.    
Turning next to unbalanced states with substantial Republican majorities, SC has a PR value 
favoring Republicans and with a smaller magnitude to that of the negative PR in MD favoring 
                                                     
87 Quite likely, the problem is that averages obscure the possibility that Republicans may be packed in 
certain regions of the state, where a Republican district has been drawn, and diluted in other regions, 
leading to a relatively homogeneous average. 
88 This is basically what reformers in MD advocate.  
89 This might require even more severe packing of the two highly urban MD districts that have over 70% 
Democratic preference. 
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Democrats.  However, because SC has a larger PGD (1.9) than the PGR in MD (1.0), its PRSMD 
would be smaller so the magnitude of its PRP could be larger and more biased than MD.  TN has 
a bit smaller PR value than SC, but its PGD value is much larger suggesting that TN is even 
more biased than SC.  TX has the largest PGS and PGD values and the smallest PR value, so it is 
difficult to compare it to TN and SC.  The PR value for TX is close to the magnitude of PR for 
CA, but the PGD is twice as large as the PGR for CA, so its PRP would be larger, suggesting 
more R bias in TX than D bias in CA.   
For the balanced states in our survey, it is noteworthy that all four have much larger values of 
PGD than of PGR, so PG favors Republicans as emphasized by Chen and Rodden 2018.  
Nevertheless, the PR value for CO is quite fair in contrast to the values for the other three 
balanced states.  However, the latter values are quite interesting when compared to the PR values 
for the unbalanced states.  It is particularly noteworthy that the magnitude of PR in CA is larger 
than in PA.  Superficially, this might suggest that CA is more gerrymandered than PA.   
However, this does not take into account the possibility that CA requires a substantial value of 
PRSMD whereas PRSMD close to 0 is achievable in PA.   That could make the PRP bias for CA 
smaller than for PA.  This reversal of the comparative bias of the CA and PA plans would thus 
be accounted for by subtracting the bias embedded in the SMD system. 
While PRP is well defined in Eq. (C.2.1), it can’t be evaluated just from a plan itself because 
PRSMD is not simply obtainable except by drawing many other possible plans.  This is a 
drawback to this way of evaluating partisan bias, although it could be overcome by generating 
many plans by computer.  A more serious drawback noted in footnote 3 is arbitrariness in 
imposing constraints on which maps are acceptable to establish the value of PRSMD.  
The complications engendered by the considerations in this appendix account for our 
preference for the core of simple measures discussed in the main text. 
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